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Fault tolerant quantum error correction (QEC) networks are studied by a combination of numer-
ical and approximate analytical treatments. The probability of failure of the recovery operation is
calculated for a variety of CSS codes, including large block codes and concatenated codes. Recent
insights into the syndrome extraction process, which render the whole process more efficient and
more noise-tolerant, are incorporated. The average number of recoveries which can be completed
without failure is thus estimated as a function of various parameters. The main parameters are
the gate (γ) and memory (ǫ) failure rates, the physical scale-up of the computer size, and the time
tm required for measurements and classical processing. The achievable computation size is given
as a surface in parameter space. This indicates the noise threshold as well as other information.
It is found that concatenated codes based on the [[23, 1, 7]] Golay code give higher thresholds than
those based on the [[7, 1, 3]] Hamming code under most conditions. The threshold gate noise γ0
is a function of ǫ/γ and tm; example values are {ǫ/γ, tm, γ0} = {1, 1, 10
−3}, {0.01, 1, 3 × 10−3},
{1, 100, 10−4}, {0.01, 100, 2× 10−3}, assuming zero cost for information transport. This represents
an order of magnitude increase in tolerated memory noise, compared with previous calculations,
which is made possible by recent insights into the fault-tolerant QEC process.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Lx, 89.70.+c
The possibility of robust storage and manipulation of
quantum information has profound practical and theo-
retical implications. It would allow highly complex quan-
tum interference and entanglement phenomena, includ-
ing quantum computing, to be realized in the laboratory,
and it also underlies a new and as yet little understood
area of physics concerning the thermodynamics of com-
plex entangled quantum systems.
The challenge of achieving precise manipulation of
quantum information has inspired much ingenuity, and
many established methods of experimental physics, such
as adiabatic passage, geometric phases, spin echo and
their generalizations can be useful. These provide an im-
provement in the precision of some driven evolution by
a given factor at a cost in speed, for example a slow-
down of the evolution by the same factor. Such methods
may play a useful role in a quantum computer, but they
cannot provide all the stability required, for two reasons.
First the slow-down is unacceptable when large quantum
algorithms are contemplated, and secondly it is doubtful
whether they will in practice achieve the relative preci-
sion of order 1/KQ which is needed to allow a successful
computation involving Q elementary steps on K logical
qubits, when KQ reaches values≫ 106 which are needed
for computations large enough that a quantum computer
could out-perform the best available classical computer.
Quantum error correction (QEC) [1, 2, 3, 4] may allow
a precision ≪ 10−6 per logical operation to be attained
in quantum computers. In order for this to be possible,
QEC must be applied in a fault-tolerant manner, that is,
the QEC process is constructed so that it removes more
noise than it generates when it is itself imperfect. The
main concepts of fault-tolerance were introduced by Shor
[5], and further insights have been discovered by several
authors [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. Most
of these studies have been concerned with the discovery
of methods which achieve fault-tolerance in a quantum
computer, and with finding scaling laws which describe
how the tolerated noise level varies with the length of
the computation. In this paper I address the problem of
estimating the amount of noise which can be tolerated,
and quantifying the cost of the stability in terms of the
required increase in the number of physical qubits in the
computer.
Some previous efforts to answer these questions have
concentrated on the idea of the threshold. This is the
result that arbitrarily long quantum computations can
be robust, under various reasonable assumptions, once
the noise per quantum gate and per qubit during the
duration of a gate is below a threshold value which does
not depend on the size KQ of the computation [7, 10, 11,
15, 17, 18]. Estimates of the value of this threshold have
varied between 10−6 and 10−3, in the case that gates can
act between any pair of qubits in the computer. In view
of this wide range, a new calculation of the threshold
is valuable, and is one of the aims of this paper. The
discussion will include various issues such as the speed
of measurements and classical processing, and the best
choice of encoding, which have been not been addressed
up till now.
However, the threshold result is of limited practical sig-
nificance, because the encoding it requires (namely mul-
tiply concatenated coding) fails to take advantage of a
fundamental property of error correction theory, which
is the existence of good codes. These have rate k/n and
relative distance d/n both bounded from below as the
block size n increases; they allow error-free transmission
of information at a rate close to the channel capacity.
2Once the noise is brought moderately below the highest
threshold offered by multiply concatenated codes, good
encodings (which do not have a threshold result) allow
very large quantum algorithms to be stabilized at a much
lower cost in scale-up of the physical resources (qubits
and operations) of the computer. The only existing es-
timate [12] of what these good codes can achieve used a
simple analysis which is only valid in the limit of low noise
rate, and which does not take advantage of recent insights
into the syndrome extraction process [14]. It remains
difficult to compare this estimate with the threshold cal-
culations, because each depends on the noise model and
the way the noise rate is parameterized, and different
authors make different choices. The present paper treats
both unconcatenated and concatenated codes together,
and so permits a comparison between them.
A central concept which emerges from this uniform
treatment is to regard the maximum computation size
KQ which can be stabilized as itself a function of vari-
ous parameters. These parameters divide into two types.
The first type quantifies the noise and imprecision which
can be tolerated, the second type quantifies the demands
on the physical hardware, such as the degree of paral-
lelism and especially the redundancy or scale-up (increase
in number of qubits) required. Hence KQ is best under-
stood as a surface, i.e. a function of two main parameters:
the tolerated noise level and the physical scale-up. The
threshold result is an interesting asymptotic behaviour of
this surface in the region of high noise and scale-up, but
what we would like to know, and what is also here dis-
cussed, is the form of the surface elsewhere in parameter
space.
These questions are here addressed by numerical sim-
ulations of quantum error correcting networks, and by a
detailed approximate analysis.
The paper is laid out as follows. The basic concepts of
fault-tolerant quantum computing are briefly sketched in
section 1, and the noise model adopted in the rest of the
paper is described. Section 2 gives the complete protocol
for QEC, explaining various choices about the way the
networks are constructed. Section 3 presents the results
of numerical simulations of these networks for the case
of the [[7, 1, 3]] Hamming code and the [[23, 1, 7]] Golay
code. Section 4 gives an analysis of the noise and error
propagation in the QEC protocol. The numerical results
are used to provide values of two fitted parameters, and
to confirm the correctness of the general trends predicted
by the analysis. The results of the analysis are then pre-
sented for 18 different quantum codes, correcting between
1 and 9 errors, and encoding between 1 and 43 qubits
per block. Section 5 adapts the analysis to the case of
concatenated coding. The results of concatenating once
are presented, and the threshold associated with multi-
ple concatenations is calculated. Section 6 then describes
and discusses the KQ surface.
Fault-tolerant computation and fault-tolerant data
storage are largely similar in that the recovery operations
dominate the dynamics. Nevertheless there is a distinc-
tion between them. The present treatment is thorough
for the case of data storage, and it is argued in section
3 that a judicious placement of logic gates in between
recoveries allows the case of fault-tolerant computation
to be like data storage with simply some additional noise
from those gates. Therefore the present results apply to
computation (not just data storage). However a more
thorough treatment of the error propagation directly be-
tween data blocks is needed in order to clarify this point.
The main results are as follows. First, the threshold for
quantum computing using multiply concatenated coding
is higher when the code is based on the [[23, 1, 7]] quan-
tum Golay code rather than the [[7, 1, 3]] Hamming code.
The former also requires a lower scale-up at given KQ
than the latter so is advantageous for both reasons. It is
found that the time taken to complete measurements and
classical processing on qubits is also a significant factor
which has mostly been overlooked in previous treatments.
When the noise ǫ per memory qubit per gate time is the
same as the noise γ associated with a gate, and the mea-
surement of a qubit takes the same time as a quantum
gate, the threshold is γ0 = ǫ0 ≃ 10−3. If the measure-
ment takes 100 times longer than a gate, the threshold is
γ0 = ǫ0 ≃ 10−4. When the noise per memory qubit per
gate time is 100 times smaller than that of a quantum
gate, the threshold is γ0 = 100ǫ0 ≃ 2 × 10−3 (see figure
7 for more information).
The completeKQ surface, plotted on logarithmic axes,
is found to have the shape approximately of a set of in-
clined planes separated by steep cliffs, revealing quasi-
threshold behaviour in scale-up as well as noise (figures
8–10). The jumps in KQ as a function of scale-up oc-
cur when new types of encoding become possible. When
the noise is an order of magnitude below threshold, and
memory is much less noisy than gates, a scale-up of order
10 permits KQ up to ∼ 1010 by using good codes such
as BCH codes. At a scale-up of order 1000, KQ up to
∼ 1040 is available by using a good code concatenated
once with the [[23, 1, 7]] Golay code. If the memory is as
noisy as the gate operations (which could be the case, for
example, when information is moved around using swaps
between neighbouring bits), a larger scale-up or smaller
gate noise is required.
I. BASIC CONCEPTS
A quantum computer stabilized by QEC methods has
three stages in its operation. First there is a prepara-
tion stage, which places the computer in a close approx-
imation to the state | 0(K) 〉L which is the logical zero
state of the K logical qubits of the computer. Then
there is a sequence of Q logical operations, interspersed
with error correction (also called recovery) of the whole
computer. Then the individual physical bits of the com-
puter are measured in the computational basis, and a
final error-correction is applied by classical computation
to the classical data thus acquired. The overall proba-
3bility of success is the probability that the classical bit
string obtained at the end of this final recovery repre-
sents a correct solution to the computational problem
being addressed.
For the initial preparation stage, a sufficient approxi-
mation to | 0(K) 〉L can be obtained by a fault-tolerant
measurement of the logical state of all the logical qubits,
combined with an error correction [12], followed by fault-
tolerant gates to flip logical bits which were found to be
in the logical 1 state.
The final classical correction can be represented in
an abstract way as an operation R on the density ma-
trix ρ(Q) of the computer after the Q’th computational
step. Then a suitable measure of success of stabiliza-
tion by QEC is the fidelity FQ ≡ 〈ψ(Q)|R(ρ(Q)) |ψ(Q)〉,
where |ψ(Q)〉 = UQ
∣∣0(K)〉
L
is the ideal (i.e. noise and
imperfection-free) state of the computer after a sequence
of Q perfectly-executed elementary steps.
An exact calculation of FQ is extremely difficult, and
cannot be attained for a system of even just a few logi-
cal bits and operations, owing to the complexities of the
encoded states and of the interactions of the physical
qubits with each other and the rest of the world. In this
paper FQ will be estimated by adopting a very simple
noise model and performing a numerical and combinato-
rial analysis of the QEC networks.
The computer will be encoded using a quantum error
correcting code of parameters [[n, k, d]] where n is the
number of physical qubits per block, k is the number of
logical qubits per block (which N.B. can be greater than
1) and d is the minimum distance of the code. The code
is t-error correcting where t = (d−1)/2. The networks to
perform recovery will be built according the recipe put
forward in [12, 14, 19], which I will outline in section II.
A. Noise model
‘Noise’ in the context of QEC is taken to mean any
process which causes the state of the physical qubits of
the computer to be different from what it should ideally
be [4, 20, 21, 22]. Thus we include undesired interactions
between the qubits, and terms in their internal Hamilto-
nian and in their coupling to the environment which are
known to be present but which cause undesired effects, as
well as further terms whose details may be unknown us,
all under the umbrella concept of ‘noise’. It is an estab-
lished feature of QEC that the overall effect of noise can
be understood in terms of the set of Pauli operators and
the identity acting on the physical qubits. I will write
these operators I,X, Z and Y = XZ. It is convenient
to define the Y operator so that it is real, it then differs
from the Pauli operator σy by a factor of i which does
not affect the argument.
It is important to distinguish between the processes
which cause imperfection in the computer state, which
I will call ‘failures’, and the resulting imperfections in
the state, which I will call ‘errors’. For example, a sin-
gle failure of a two-qubit gate can result in two errors,
meaning the state after the failure involves errors in two
of the physical qubits (that is, a tensor product of Pauli
operators on both qubits is required to restore the state).
In general after the action of some quantum network, a
single failure somewhere in the network can result in mul-
tiple errors. The main feature of ‘fault-tolerant’ networks
is that a single failure anywhere in the network leads to
only one error (or an acceptable number of errors) per
encoded block. A set of m single-bit errors on m qubits
will also be referred to as an error of weight m.
When the noise produces an effect large enough that
the computer state cannot be corrected by QEC, the
whole quantum computation must be assumed to fail,
since it is close to certain that it will not produce a use-
ful result (FQ ≃ 0). This situation will be called a crash.
QEC and fault-tolerant gate methods allow the crash
probability to be much smaller than the failure probabil-
ity of individual elementary operations on the physical
qubits.
The noise model which I will adopt for the purpose
of estimating FQ is as follows. At each time step, every
freely evolving physical qubit has no change in its state
with probability 1−ǫ, or undergoes rotation by the oper-
atorX,Y or Z with equal probabilities ǫ/3. Such failures
are termed ‘memory failures’ and ǫ is the memory failure
probability. Every gate is modeled by a failure followed
by a perfect operation of the gate. The failure for a
single-qubit gate is the same as a memory failure except
that it occurs with probability γ1. The failure of a two-
qubit gate is modeled as a process where with probability
1 − γ2 no change takes place before the gate, and with
equal probabilities γ2/15 one of the 15 possible single-
or two-qubit failures takes place (these are IX, IY, IZ,
XI,XX,XY,XZ, Y I, Y X, Y Y, Y Z, ZI, ZX,ZY, ZZ).
Every preparation of a single physical bit in |0〉 will be
modeled as a perfect preparation follow by a single-bit
failure of probability γp. Every measurement of a single
physical qubit will be modeled as a single-qubit failure
of probability γm, followed by a perfect measurement.
Such a model accounts satisfactorily for the main ways
in which measurements can fail, with this exception: a
qubit measurement might give a certain eigenvalue λ as
measured outcome, but the qubit is not projected into
the corresponding eigenstate |λ〉. In the present con-
text, however, the latter case is equivalent in its effects
to the case which is modeled (i.e. failure followed by per-
fect measurement), because the measurements are always
used to acquire syndrome information. All that matters
is that the measured eigenvalue either does or does not
correctly indicate the error in the computer: this is ac-
counted for by the model. The case where the syndrome
bit was projected onto a state other than |λ〉 does not
have any further impact on the computer because we
never re-use measured bits without re-preparing them in
|0〉 (a process which has its own failure probability γp).
‘Leakage’ failures, which occur when the physical com-
puter moves out of the Hilbert space spanned by the
4physical qubits, are assumed to be suppressed by tech-
niques such as optical pumping or small leakage mea-
suring networks [7] and hence converted into failures of
the type already considered. The leakage probability is
absorbed into the gate and memory failure probabilities.
The model is defined so that qubits participating in
a gate in a given time-step undergo gate noise but not
memory noise. In other words, the gate noise parameters
γi are defined in such a way that they include all the noise
acting on the qubits participating in the gate during the
time of action of the gate. It is necessary to be explicit
about this distinction for the calculation of thresholds in
section VB.
The QEC networks I will analyze are composed only
of the single-qubit Hadamard transform and two-qubit
controlled-not or controlled-phase gates, and state prepa-
ration and measurement of single qubits in the computa-
tional basis.
An implicit assumption of this noise model is that fail-
ures are uncorrelated and stochastic. The first assump-
tion (uncorrelated failures) can be relaxed without signif-
icantly changing the overall results as long as correlated
failures have probability sufficiently smaller than uncor-
related ones. In a single time-step, uncorrelated memory
failures in n qubits give m-bit errors with probability
B(n,m, ǫ) ≡ n!
m!(n−m)!ǫ
m(1− ǫ)n−m. (1)
If correlated failures (for example due to m-body inter-
actions between the physical qubits) have a probability
small compared to this then they can be neglected in a
calculation of the crash probability without significantly
affecting the result. Unwanted systematic effects in a
computing device will also cause a finite correlation be-
tween the failures in nominally independent gate opera-
tions, but if the probability for a weight-m error to be
produced by correlated gate failure is small compared to
the probability that the same error is produced by uncor-
related gate failures, then it is sufficient to analyze the
latter.
Similar statements can be made about non-stochastic
contributions to the noise. An example is rotation er-
rors: if a given qubit is erroneously rotated m times by
a small angle θ, then if the angles are all in the same
direction they add coherently to give a net angle mθ and
error probability ∼ m2θ2, whereas if the direction of ro-
tation is random, a random walk is produced resulting in
a mean net rotation
√
mθ and overall error probability
∼ mθ2. The model treated here assumes the latter case;
this will cover the main features as long as the coher-
ent contribution gives a net error similar to or less than
the incoherent one for each application of the recovery
network.
Recently Alicki et al. [23] have drawn attention to
another implicit assumption, namely that the noise is
independent of the dynamics of the recovery network,
which they show is false for quantum reservoirs with long-
range ‘memory’ (such as electromagnetic vacuum). This
implies the noise is both correlated and non-stochastic.
The argument is subtle and it remains an open ques-
tion whether the structure of the correlations is of a type
which defeats fault-tolerant QEC, or has an influence
small compared to the stochastic uncorrelated part which
I will estimate here.
II. CORRECTION PROTOCOL
A fault-tolerant error correction can be accomplished
with a variety of choices of exactly how the syndrome ex-
traction network is constructed. Here I will make choices
which I have previously argued to be close to optimal,
when considerations of noise tolerance and the overall
required scale-up are both taken into account.
Transversal operation of a gate means the gate is ap-
plied once to each physical qubit in a block, or once to
each corresponding pair of physical qubits in a pair of
blocks for the case of a 2-qubit gate. Blockwise action of
an operator means the operator is applied once to each
logical qubit in a block, or once to each corresponding
pair of logical qubits in a pair of blocks for the case of a
2-qubit gate.
The QEC code will be a CSS code obtained from a clas-
sical code which contains its dual. Such codes have the
property that transversal controlled-not and controlled-
phase operations act as blockwise controlled-not and
controlled-phase operations respectively, and transversal
Hadamard acts as blockwise Hadamard [8, 12]. A fur-
ther property is useful for constructing fault-tolerant log-
ical operations, though it is not needed for fault-tolerant
QEC. This is the property that the underlying classical
code is doubly even (i.e. the codewords have weights a
multiple of 4) [5, 8, 12]. I will restrict attention here to
such codes.
If the algorithm to be accomplished requires KI qubits
on an ideal (noise-free) machine, then the real computer
has K logical qubits encoded in K/k blocks, each block
consisting of n physical qubits, where K is larger than
KI by a fixed small amount which can be < 10. The few
extra blocks are necessary as workspace to allow fault-
tolerant logical operations on the logical qubits using
methods such as teleportation.
For each such ‘data block’ the computer contains in
addition 2nrep ancilla blocks of n physical qubits each,
and 2nrep sets of verification bits, each set containing
(n+ k)/2 physical qubits. The total number of physical
qubits in the computer is thus
N = (n+ nrep(3n+ k))K/k. (2)
nrep is the number of pairs of ancilla blocks per data block
which can be prepared in parallel, in order to speed up
syndrome extraction; it will have a value typically in the
range 1 to 10.
The verification bits are used to verify prepared ancilla
states. The stabilizer of the zero state | 0(k) 〉L of a single
block (i.e. k logical bits) is generated by a set of n linearly
5independent operators. This set can be expressed such
that it divides into a subset of (n − k)/2 which consist
of tensor products of X operators, and (n + k)/2 which
consist of tensor products of Z operators. The ancilla
state is verified once against X errors only, by measuring
the eigenvalues of the latter subset (the one composed of
Z operators) using the verification bits. It is proved in
[14] that this single verification is sufficient to produce the
correct fault-tolerant behaviour when the detailed form
of the set of stabilizers is properly chosen.
A single complete recovery consists of X-error correc-
tion and Z-error correction. These two halves of the cor-
rection proceed in parallel. While the X-error correction
machinery is preparing ancilla states, the Z-error correc-
tion machinery is coupling its ancillas to the data blocks,
and vice versa. A single complete X-error correction of a
single data block proceeds as follows, and the Z-error cor-
rection is identical except where indicated (for diagrams
see [12, 13, 19]). Correction of different data blocks pro-
ceeds in parallel.
1. Prepare nrep ancilla blocks in | 0(n) 〉.
2. Operate a network G in parallel on each of these
ancilla blocks. G consists of Hadamards and
controlled-not gates, and if perfect would produce
the transformation | 0(n) 〉 → | 0(k) 〉L.
3. Using verification bits prepared in (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2,
verify the ancilla blocks by operating a network V
consisting of controlled-phase gates between each
ancilla block and its verification bits, followed by
Hadamard transformation of the verification bits
and their measurement in the computational basis.
4. Ancilla blocks which pass the verification (i.e. all
verification bits were found in the state |0〉 when
measured) are deemed ‘good’ and are used in the
rest of the protocol. Those that do not are left
alone until they are re-prepared at the beginning
of the next round of QEC. Let α be the fraction
which are good, so that we now have αnrep good
ancillas.
5. Couple 1 ‘good’ ancilla to the data block by
blockwise controlled-phase (for X-error correction)
or controlled-not (for Z-error correction), with
the ancilla acting as control, the data as target.
Hadamard transform this ancilla block and then
measure each of its physical qubits in the compu-
tational basis. Use a classical computer to decode
the classical bit string thus obtained, and hence de-
rive the error syndrome [13, 16].
6. If this syndrome is zero, no further action is taken.
The data block rests until recovery has been com-
pleted on all the data blocks in the computer whose
first syndrome was not zero. Let β be the fraction
of blocks which give a zero syndrome.
7. (a) Otherwise, couple r − 1 further good ancillas
to the data block by blockwise controlled-phase
(controlled-not), for X-correction (Z-correction),
where r is a parameter to be optimized. Hadamard
transform and measure these ancillas in parallel, as
in step 5.
8. (a) We now have a total of r syndromes extracted
for each data block whose first syndrome was non-
zero. We accept any group of r′ syndromes which
all agree, where r′ is a parameter to be optimized.
When a syndrome is accepted, the data block is
corrected accordingly by application of one or more
X gates (or Z gates). If no acceptable syndrome
is found, no further action is taken, so the data
block goes uncorrected for X errors (Z errors) in
this round of QEC.
Steps 7(a) and 8(a) will be modified below, but to
understand the modification it helps to begin with the
statements as given.
The syndrome repetition factors r and r′ ≤ r will be
chosen so as to maximize the probability of success. In-
creasing r′ reduces the probability of accepting a wrong
syndrome, but increasing r increases the noise accumu-
lating in the data block. The αnrep− 1 good ancillas per
data block which were not used in step 5 are sufficient to
allow r ≤ rmax = 1+ (αnrep − 1)/(1− β).
In the protocol described we have αnrep good ancillas
per data block during each round of QEC, and we require
on average β+r(1−β) for one correction. Hence we have
enough ancillas to complete αnrep/(β + r(1 − β)) inde-
pendent corrections almost in parallel[30]. The sequential
part is the gates which couple data and ancilla. Increas-
ing nrep reduces the time during which the data is left
alone between corrections, so is valuable when the mem-
ory noise accumulating directly in the data contributes a
significant part of the total data errors. However, much
of the error in the data arises by propagation from the
ancillas, or from the gates coupling data and ancillas, and
these contributions are unaffected by nrep.
We will mostly be interested in the case of large quan-
tum algorithms, for which the failure rates must be small
so α and β are close to 1, and the number of corrections
in parallel is close to nrep. The exception is when a con-
catenated code is being used, with error rates close to the
threshold. In this case α and β can be of order 0.5 for
the innermost levels of the concatenated coding hierar-
chy, therefore nrep must be increased to allow sufficient
ancillas for rapid correction.
The protocol can be refined primarily in two ways.
First, one can operate a different and possibly more so-
phisticated scheme to prepare and verify ancillas in step
3, and secondly one can adopt a more sophisticated re-
sponse to the syndrome information in steps 7 and 8.
For example, in step 3 one could verify the ancilla twice
and accept if it passed at least once, or one could pre-
pare two ancillas and then compare them by a transversal
6controlled-not followed by measurement of one. The for-
mer case requires more time, which can be compensated
by an increase in nrep, and the second case requires more
ancillas. However, any attempt to improve the ancilla
preparation can only result in a modest reduction of the
crash probability (at given noise rate) because the gates
connecting ancilla and data cause much of the noise in
the data, and these cannot be avoided. This is discussed
after equations (10), (11) below.
An example of a more sophisticated procedure in step
(8) is to extract more syndromes immediately if insuf-
ficient syndromes agree. In his calculation, Zalka [24]
employed refinements of this kind. However, such a re-
sponse is only valuable if it can be made quickly, and this
requires fast measurements. It is physically reasonable to
suppose that measurement of a qubit may be slow com-
pared to one time step, where a time step is the duration
of a two-qubit gate. When measurement is slow it is bet-
ter to couple syndrome information into ancillas as many
times as will be required all at once, and then measure the
ancillas in parallel. Therefore if one wishes to extract one
further syndrome in step (8) when insufficient syndromes
agree, it is advantageous to extract further syndromes as
well and one has in the end a protocol close to the one
being considered.
There is a modification to steps 7 and 8 which is worth
making since it requires only a slight change in the clas-
sical part of the processing so has negligible cost. This is
to improve the case where no acceptable syndrome was
found for a given block. In this case, at the next recovery
rather than extracting a further r syndromes, we extract
r′′ ≤ r where r′′ is another parameter to be optimized,
and then make the best use of the r+r′′ syndromes avail-
able from the most recent extractions. Typical values for
r′′ are in the range r/2 to r.
7. (b) In the case that at the last recovery, sufficient
syndromes were found in agreement for the block to
be corrected for the error-type under consideration,
proceed as in 7(a). Otherwise, now extract r′′ − 1
syndromes.
8. (b) In the case that at the last recovery, sufficient
syndromes were found in agreement for the block
to be corrected for the error-type under considera-
tion, proceed as in 8(a). Otherwise, now examine
the r+r′′ most recent syndromes obtained from this
and previous recovery attempts. Accept any group
of r′ syndromes which all agree, giving preference
to more recently extracted syndromes if there is
more than one acceptable group. If there is an ac-
ceptable set of syndromes, correct the data block
accordingly, otherwise do nothing.
This reduces the noise in the data by making better
use of the syndrome information. Further refinements
are possible, for example to adjust the case where three
successive extractions were necessary, but in any case this
is already a small adjustment so there is not much further
improvement available.
A. Number of recoveries per computational step
It might be thought that when the recovery time
tR ≫ 1, which is typically the case, it would be ad-
vantageous to allow many logical gates to operate per
recovery, as was argued by Zalka [24]. However, if the
logical gates are not on independent bits, then it is dan-
gerous to allow many of them between recoveries or the
error propagation will start to avalanche. Also, it might
be argued that sometimes it is only necessary to recover
some of the blocks. However, typically the recovery time
is long enough that noise accumulating in all blocks is
such that they all need correcting. Therefore the choice
adopted here is that the whole computer must be recov-
ered after any simple logical gate such as controlled-not
or Hadamard is applied. On those occasions in a given
algorithm where many logical gates can act simultane-
ously, then they are implemented in parallel, followed by
one complete recovery.
The logical gates are accomplished in a fault-tolerant
manner by sequences of appropriately chosen gates and
measurements [8, 9, 12]. To quantify the algorithm size
KQ precisely, we must be specific about what type of
gate we are counting, because some are easier to ac-
complish than others. For example, a fault-tolerant net-
work for a Toffoli gate may require 8 recoveries, while a
controlled-not gate may only require 1 or 2. Since the
main quantity to be calculated is the crash probability
per recovery of a single block, the “computation size” will
be taken to be the number of such recoveries when a code
with k = 1 (one logical bit per block) is used. Codes with
k > 1 require more recoveries because the fault-tolerant
constructions are slightly more complicated. It can be
shown that for standard logical gates such as controlled-
not and Toffoli, networks for k > 1 exist which involve
approximately twice as many recoveries as similar net-
works for k = 1, therefore to make a fair comparison it
will be assumed here that for a given algorithm, on av-
erage twice as many recoveries are needed when k > 1
than when k = 1.
B. Timing and non-nearest-neighbour coupling
The correction protocol involves networks G and V
for preparing and verifying ancillas, measurement of sets
of bits, and transversal controlled-gates between ancilla
and data blocks. The precise set of operations in G and
V is mostly dictated by the structure of the code, with
some moderate room for flexibility in the time ordering
of gates and in which set of linearly independent parity
checks is chosen. The total time taken by the operations,
by contrast, and hence the memory noise, is dictated not
only by the logic of the network, but also by the physical
capabilities of the computing device. It will be assumed
here that the computing device is capable of all the par-
allelism which is logically available in the QEC protocol.
Parallel operation of two or more gates is logically avail-
7able when the gates commute, so that their effect is the
same when they are applied all at once or sequentially.
For example, the assumption implies that a transversal
gate operation takes a single time-step, and that parallel
operation is physically available for sets of gates within
the G and V networks, which is useful for speeding up
the ancilla preparation.
The G and V networks are related to the generator
matrix and parity check matrix of the classical code C
whose codewords u give the state∣∣∣0(k)〉
L
=
∑
u∈C
|u〉 . (3)
Let H be the check matrix of C, then the parallelism
available in the G and V networks was shown in [14] to
allow the controlled-gates in these networks to be com-
pleted in w and w+1 time steps respectively, where w is
the maximum weight of a column or row of the matrix A
given by H = (I A) where I is the (n+ k)/2× (n+ k)/2
identity matrix. A further time interval is required for
the Hadamard operations and single-bit measurements
and state preparations.
Consider the case that 2-bit gates such as controlled-
not are only available in the physical computer between
neighbouring physical bits. In this case we have to al-
low some time, and associated noise, for the transport
of the physical qubit information from one place to an-
other in the computer. A reasonable rough model of this
is to suppose that the speed and precision of a gate be-
tween qubits initially separated by distance s scales as
1+s/D, where the 1 accounts for the cost of the nearest-
neighbour gate, and s/D accounts for the cost of bringing
the bits together from distance s. In this model, D ≃ 1
is a reasonable estimate for a computer which transports
information by repeated swap operations between fixed
physical qubits, and D ≫ 1 describes a computer which
can move information around at little cost. In the QEC
network, physical gates are mostly between qubits which
can be fairly close together, such as within part of one
block, so a value D ∼ 100 is sufficient to allow D to
be large compared to the mean distance s¯ spanned by
2-qubit gates involved in the QEC network [19]. In the
estimates to follow, I will make the simplifying assump-
tion of ignoring the cost of the physical separation be-
tween physical qubits. The results for the noise tolerance
will therefore be valid only when s¯ ≪ D. I can use the
results to roughly estimate what will happen for a com-
puter having smaller D by dividing the tolerated error
rates by 1 + s¯/D. Calculations of s¯ for two quantum
error correcting codes are described in [19].
Another timing consideration is involved in the mea-
surements and the classical processing of the syndromes.
It is an important assumption that the verification bits
and the error syndromes are in fact measured, and not
treated by purely unitary networks. This allows a sub-
stantial part of the processing of this information to be
done classically, which I assume is both fast and precise.
The time involved in measuring a physical qubit and com-
pleting classical processing on the measured eigenvalue
will be assumed to be tm time-steps, where 1 time-step
is the time required for a controlled-not (or controlled-
phase) operation. Typical values for tm are in the range
1 ≤ tm ≤ 100, which may be associated mostly with the
measurement time, making the assumption that the clas-
sical processor has a clock rate much faster than that of
the quantum processor.
III. NUMERICAL CALCULATIONS
The effects of noise and error propagation in the pro-
tocol described in section II were numerically calculated.
It is possible to do this in an efficient way because it is
sufficient to keep track of the propagation of the errors,
rather than the evolution of the complete computer state.
The C++ program keeps an array of 2n+(n+k)/2 bi-
nary digits representingX errors in the physical qubits of
one data block and one ancilla with its verification bits,
and a similar array representing Z errors. Failures are
generated randomly in every gate and time-step, accord-
ing to the model described in section IA, by adding 1 to
members of the X and/or Z error arrays at the locations
of those qubits experiencing an X and/or Z failure re-
spectively. The ancilla bits are re-used for the repeated
ancilla preparations and for the X and Z syndrome ex-
traction, but memory noise is added to the data block
appropriate to the amount of time passing when 2nrep
ancillas are available in parallel.
The action of each quantum gate in the networks is
modeled by first producing random failure, using the
model described in section IA, and then accounting for
error propagation. The error propagation part is as fol-
lows: a Hadamard gate on a single qubit swaps theX and
Z error values for that qubit; a controlled-not gate adds
the X error of the control bit to the target bit, and the
Z error of the target bit to the control bit; a controlled-
phase gate adds the X error value of the control bit to
the Z error value of the target bit, and the X error value
of the target bit to the Z error value of the control bit.
It was found that a good pseudo-random number gen-
erator was needed in order to get reliable results at low
crash probability. For example the generator ‘ran0’ in
[25] was inadequate; ‘ran3’ was used instead.
The network of gates is obtained directly from the
check and generator matrices of the relevant classical
codes, see appendix for details. The gate failures were
added at the locations in space and time of the relevant
gates. The memory failures were not modeled exactly in
the right way however. To save program time, during the
G and V networks, rather than adding memory failures
only to those bits not involved in a gate at a given time,
memory failures were distributed randomly amongst all
the bits, with probabilities set so that the mean number
of failures was correct. This change is not likely to affect
the precision of the final result, which in any case can
only be compared to physical examples in an approxi-
8mate way owing to the simple noise model.
The noise caused by logical operations on the data was
partially modeled by adding a further gate failure to each
qubit in the data between each round of QEC. This com-
pletely accounts for single-block gates but not the error
propagation between data blocks caused by logic gates
between data blocks. However, at any stage typically
only a few logical qubits are involved in 2-bit gates, and
these can be timed so as to keep error propagation to
a minimum, as follows. If a controlled-phase logic gate
is to be implemented, it should be placed just after X
error correction on both blocks involved, since at this
stage in their evolution the blocks temporarily have a
minimal number of X errors, and only this type of error
is propagated (into Z on the other block) by the gate.
Similarly, if a controlled-not gate is to be implemented,
it should be placed just after the control bits have had
X error correction, and the target bits Z error correc-
tion. The cost of this is that sometimes one or a few
blocks have to wait a little longer before being corrected,
so that memory noise occurring directly in the data block
accumulates for longer. However, since this noise is not
the main source of data errors, the omission of this detail
from the numerical simulation is not expected to affect
the final result significantly.
A single logical step consists of a single transversal gate
acting on the data block, followed by the complete QEC
protocol. The program repeats this Q times to repre-
sent an algorithm of Q steps. After each step, the X
and Z bit-error arrays are examined to see if the accu-
mulated noise represents an uncorrectable error. If an
uncorrectable error has occurred, the run is stopped and
a record is kept of how many steps were completed suc-
cessfully. This is repeated a large number (millions) of
times and the relative frequencies of success or a crash
are used to obtain estimates of the fidelity of a quantum
computer stabilized by QEC, see below. This is a type
of Monte-Carlo simulation.
The numerical calculations were carried out for two ex-
ample codes, the [[7, 1, 3]] single-error correcting code ob-
tained from a classical Hamming code, and the [[23, 1, 7]]
three-error correcting code obtained from a classical Go-
lay code. The classical codes in both these examples
are perfect, so their quantum versions perform especially
well.
In order to interpret the X and Z bit-error arrays to
discover whether they represent an uncorrectable error,
it is necessary to recall the properties of quantum codes.
The combination of the X and Z errors represents an
error operator E which has acted on the data qubits.
However, the weight of E does not in itself determine
whether E is correctable. For example, if E is in the sta-
bilizer then it constitutes no error at all. It is necessary
to determine rather whether E |ψ〉L would be decoded to
|ψ〉L by a perfect recovery of the computer. To do this I
calculate the syndromes HEX and HEZ where EX and
EZ are the bit-strings representing the X and Z parts
of E respectively, and H is the parity check matrix of
the classical code C (equation (3)). Each syndrome has
a coset leader, which is the minimal weight error vec-
tor which can cause that syndrome. If the weight of the
coset leader for either syndrome is greater than the num-
ber of errors correctable by the quantum code, then an
uncorrectable error has occurred[31].
The success and crash frequencies provided by the pro-
gram are interpreted as follows. Let nf (Q) and ns(Q)
be the number of runs in which the quantum computer
crashed at step Q, and the number of runs in which the
computer remained successful at step Q, respectively.
The probability that the computer crashes during step
Q, given that it has not crashed in steps 1 to Q − 1, is
then
p(Q) =
nf (Q)
ns(Q) + nf (Q)
(4)
With stochastic noise, this probability is expected to be
independent of Q once initial transient effects have died
away, and this was found to be the case. The transient
behaviour was found to last a few logical steps, with the
general form p(Q) ≃ p¯(1 − (5/4) exp(−Q/2)) for Q ≥ 1
where p¯ is the average p(Q) for large Q. Hence it was
sufficient to continue each run to 10 logical steps, and
take p¯ ≃ (p(7) + p(8) + p(9) + p(10))/4. For each case,
the simulation was repeated until nf (Q = 10) reached
100, so the statistical uncertainty in p¯ is expected to be
approximately 5%. The random part of the variation in
p¯ which is visible in figures 1–3 is consistent with this ex-
pectation. For Q > 10, the value of FQ can be estimated
as
FQ ≃ (1− p¯)Q. (5)
The estimation method to be presented in section IV
was used to predict the best choice of parameters r, r′, r′′
in the last two steps of the protocol, and the choice was
confirmed by repeated runs of the Monte-Carlo calcula-
tions. One expects r′ > 1 to be necessary so that the
probability of accepting a wrong syndrome is not linear
in the noise rates. If was found that for the [[7, 1, 3]]
code, r′ = 2 was optimal, and very similar results were
found for r = 2 or 3, r′′ = 1 or 2. For the [[23, 1, 7]] code,
r = 4, r′ = r′′ = 3 gave the best results for low noise
rates, and r = 3, r′ = r′′ = 2 for high noise rates.
Figures 1–3 show example results of these calculations.
In each case the points indicate the results of the numer-
ical calculations and the lines show the prediction of the
model to be described in section IV. The parameters
associated with the choice of code are listed in table 1
of appendix A. The noise parameters were chosen to be
γ2 = γ1 = γm = γp ≡ γ, and results for three values
of ǫ/γ are shown. Changing γ1 and/or γm by an or-
der of magnitude while leaving γ2 fixed does not have
a large effect on the results, because the networks are
dominated by the 2-qubit gates. The value of nrep can
be freely chosen, producing one route for the trade-off
between scale-up and noise-tolerance. nrep is accounted
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FIG. 1: Results of numerical calculations of p¯ (symbols)
compared with the analytical estimate (curves), at αnrep =
β + r(1− β). The symbols indicate ǫ = γ (◦), ǫ = γ/10 (+),
ǫ = γ/100 (×). The calculation used r = r′ = r′′ = 2 for
the [[7, 1, 3]] code; r = 4, r′ = r′′ = 3 for the [[23, 1, 7]] code.
(a): [[7, 1, 3]], tm = 25; (b): [[7, 1, 3]], tm = 1; (c): [[23, 1, 7]],
tm = 25; (d): [[23, 1, 7]], tm = 1.
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FIG. 2: As figure 1, but for higher nrep, here αnrep = 10(β +
r(1− β)).
for in the numerical calculations simply by adjusting the
amount of memory noise in the data bits occurring dur-
ing each round of QEC. It was convenient to treat the
case that nrep varies so that the number of parallel cor-
rections is the same for all values of γ and ǫ in a given
set of calculations.
The results in fig. 1 are for αnrep/(β+r(1−β)) = 1 (i.e.
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FIG. 3: As figure 2, but with reduced r parameters, r =
3, r′ = r′′ = 2 for the [[23, 1, 7]] code. The dotted lines show
the ‘break-even’ condition p¯ = γ to facilitate a rough estimate
of the noise threshold from these results.
nrep ≃ 1) and those in fig. 2 are for αnrep/(β+r(1−β)) =
10 (i.e. nrep ≃ 10). Fig. 3 shows the effect of reducing r:
this is expected to make matters worse at very low γ, but
better at higher γ. Comparison of figure 3 with figure 2
shows that a well-chosen reduction in r makes possible a
useful increase in the noise threshold (see section VB).
The comparison between the numerical results in fig-
ures 1–3 and the analytical prediction will be discussed
in section IVB after the analytical estimation method is
described.
IV. ESTIMATE OF CRASH PROBABILITY
The numerical method permits the crash probability
to be calculated for small codes and high noise rate. A
quantum computer performing a large computation will
require lower noise rate and larger codes which are able to
correct more errors. The Monte-Carlo simulation is too
slow to be useful it that regime. In this section I present
a general analysis of the QEC protocol which permits an
estimate of the crash probability to be made for any code
and noise rate. The analysis will also be useful in order
to understand the best strategy for code concatenation,
to be considered in section VB.
The main route by which the quantum computer
crashes is that too many errors accumulate in the data
block between one round of correction and the next.
These errors are either caused directly there by noise in
the data qubits and the gates which act on them, or
they are the result of error propagation from the noisy
ancillas. The fault-tolerant design of the QEC network
ensures that each failure can only cause one error in any
given data block, and more generally each set of m fail-
ures can only cause total error of weight m in a data
block. Let g be the number of independent gate failure
locations which can result in 1 error in the data block,
and s be the number of independent memory failure loca-
tions which can result in 1 error in the data block, during
a single recovery. The probability that an unspecified er-
ror of weight m appears in the data is given to good
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approximation by
B′(g, s,m, γ, ǫ) ≡
m∑
j=0
B(g, j, γ)B(s,m− j, ǫ) (6)
where B is the binomial function defined in equation (1).
The sum gives the probability of no gate failures and m
memory failures, plus the probability of 1 gate failure
and m − 1 memory failures, and so on up to m gate
failures and no memory failures. It involves a slight miss-
counting since sometimes different failures have the same
effect, so some sets of m failures produce an error of
weight < m. However, this miss-counting is not expected
to give the main limitation on the accuracy of the whole
calculation, for the networks under consideration.
An error is uncorrectable if it has a weight larger
than[32] t. In the limit of small γ, ǫ, the expression
p¯ ≃ 2B′(g, s, t + 1, 2γ/3, 2ǫ/3) is a rough estimate for
the crash probability per block per recovery, and hence
it is only necessary to estimate g and s for the QEC net-
work in order to roughly estimate p¯ for a given code.
The factors of 2/3 account for the fact that of all the
errors affecting any given qubit, on average 2/3 require
X-correction and 2/3 require Z-correction. This is true
for errors of any weight because they are caused by un-
correlated failures. For example, of the 9 possible 2-qubit
errors, 2 require X-correction of the 1st qubit alone, 2 of
the 2nd qubit alone, and 4 of both qubits: these numbers
are correctly given by the model as 9× (2/3)× (1− 2/3)
(twice) and 9 × (2/3) × 2/3. The overall factor 2 in p¯
is because both the X error and the Z error must be
correctable.
FIG. 4: Probability tree to aid the calculation of p¯. The
branches are labeled as follows. a: First syndrome extracted
is zero, b: the single syndrome extraction left a correctable er-
ror, c: r′ of the most recently extracted syndromes are found
to agree, d: the accepted syndrome is right, e: the multi-
ple syndrome extraction left a correctable error. The crash
probability is the sum of the probabilities of the branches
terminated by filled circles.
For a more precise estimate of p¯, the protocol must be
analyzed more fully. A more complete analysis is indi-
cated in figure 4, which gives a probability tree for the
full protocol. I assume the quantum computer crashes
not only when an uncorrectable error occurs, but also
when a sufficiently bad syndrome is accepted (the latter
is discussed further in appendix B). I take into account
the fact that the values of g and s will depend on how
many syndromes have been extracted before an accept-
able one is found allowing a correction to take place. I
will use the word recovery to mean one attempt to get
a consistent syndrome for each type of error (which will
involve either 1 or r or r′′ syndrome extractions for each
type of error) followed by the corrections which take place
if sufficient agreement among syndromes is found in step
8 of the protocol. The word correction will now refer to
the last stage of recovery only. Thus for any given data
block sometimes several recoveries have to take place be-
fore a correction can be applied.
Consider the recovery of a single data block. I will
consider just the X-errors in the data block, and the X-
syndrome, bearing in mind that X errors in the data
are produced partly by the network which extracts Z-
syndromes. The complete crash probability of the com-
puter per recovery per data block is assumed to be twice
the crash probability associated with the X-error recov-
ery of this single block.
Let PZa be the probability a verified ancilla, i.e. one
that was deemed ‘good’ in steps 3 and 4 of the proto-
col, has one or more Z-errors, so that it will produce an
incorrect syndrome for the data block.
PZa ≃
n∑
j=1
B′
(
1
2
NGV + n(1 + γ1/γ2 + γm/γ2),
1
2
Nh + tmn, j,
2
3
γ2,
2
3
ǫ
)
(7)
≃ 1
3
γ2NGV +
2
3
(γ2 + γ1 + γm)n+
1
3
ǫNh +
2
3
ǫtmn (8)
whereNGV = 2NA+(n+k)/2 is the total number of gates
in the combined G and V networks; it is dominated by
the 2NA term, where NA is the number of 1’s in the A
part of the check matrix H = (I A) from which both the
G and the V networks are obtained; Nh is the number of
‘holes’ in the G and V networks, that is, the number of
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locations in space and time where a qubit is resting and
so experiences memory- but not gate-failure:
Nh = {wn− 2NA + 3(n− k)/2}
+ {w (n+ (n+ k)/2)− 2NA + (n− k)/2}
The parameter w was discussed after equation (3); the
first line is the number of holes in G, the second is the
number of holes in V .
The factors of 2/3 and 1/2 in (8) account for the fact
that of all the failures occurring, some cause purely X
error in the ancilla which does not cause a wrong syn-
drome, and most of those that cause Y error result in
the ancilla failing the verification, so they do not affect
‘good’ ancillas. The terms involving γ1 and γm are the
contributions from failure of the final Hadamard gates
and measurements of the ancilla bits. The further term
involving γ2 is from the controlled gates connecting an-
cilla to data. Failures of the preparation of ancilla bits
in |0〉 do not contribute to PZa because |0〉 is an eigen-
state of Z. The term involving tm is the contribution
from memory failure in the ancilla during the time taken
for the verification bits to be measured. (Equation (8) is
discussed further in appendix B).
The fraction α defined in step 4 of the protocol is given
approximately by
α ≃ 1− 2
3
(NGV γ2 + nγp +Nhǫ) . (9)
This is one minus the probability that a failure of type
X or Y occurs in the G and V networks, since almost all
such failures are detected by the verification.
In what follows, I will be calculating probabilities for
X errors to be present in the data block when the X-
syndrome extraction is performed. These X errors have
three origins: the gates associated with the logical op-
eration which evolves the logical quantum computation;
the CZ gates which link an ancilla or ancillas to the data
block forX-syndrome extraction; and the network for the
preceding Z-syndrome extraction (including error prop-
agation from those ancillas to the data). In a given re-
covery either 1 or r or r′′ extractions of each type take
place, I calculate the probability of each case and deduce
the average effect.
Let g(rX , rZ) be the number of independent gate fail-
ures resulting in an X error in the data when a net-
work accomplishing rX X-syndrome extractions and rZ
Z-syndrome extractions is applied. For the same net-
work, let s(rZ) be the number of independent space-time
locations of memory failures that result in an X error
in the data. s does not depend on rX because propa-
gation from the ancillas used for X-syndrome extraction
produces Z not X errors in the data.
g(rX , rZ) ≃ n(1 + rX + (1 + µt)rZ ), (10)
s(rZ ) ≃ n (tR + (νt+ tm)rZ) , (11)
where tR = (2w + 1 + 2tm)
β + r(1 − β)
αnrep
(12)
and µ, ν are constants of order 1 to be determined. The
fraction β was defined in step 6 of the protocol; tR is
the time the data bits ‘rest’ between successive recover-
ies. The estimates of g and s are the most important to
get right, because they lead directly to the probability of
uncorrectable errors in the data. In the expression (10)
for g the first term is caused by the n elementary gates
of a single transversally-applied logic gate which may be
present between recoveries in the protocol adopted, the
second term accounts for failure of the transversal CZ
gates connecting ancillas to the data block to extract
X-syndromes, and the third term the effect of the Z-
syndrome extractions. In the last case only, error propa-
gation from the ancilla causesX errors in the data. These
errors are caused by failure of the last gates in the V net-
work; their effect is estimated by the term nµtrZ in g by
the following reasoning. The last gate of V to act on
each ancilla bit can leave an X-error there which is not
detected by the verification bits; most pairs of gate fail-
ures from the last or the penultimate set to act on each
ancilla bit can leave undetected single or doubleX-errors;
triples of gate failures from a still larger set can go un-
detected, and so on. This means that the distribution of
undetected ancilla errors caused by failures in V is not
binomial: the number of failure locations which can con-
tribute to an order-m failure is not independent of m but
increases approximately linearly with m. I can neverthe-
less use a binomial as an approximation to the true distri-
bution, as long as I make the approximation sufficiently
accurate for the most important probability I wish to cal-
culate, which is the probability of uncorrectable error in
the data block. For a t-error correcting code, this is the
probability of order-(t+ 1) failures. The term nµtrZ in
g, and a similar term in s, approximately counts the rel-
evant locations, where the constants µ and ν were found
by fitting the theory to the numerical results, see figures
1–3 and section IVB. The values µ ≃ 0.35, ν ≃ 1 were
found to give the best fit.
Note that, as remarked in section II, improving the fi-
delity of the ancillas can only slightly reduce g because
it can only reduce µ to a minimum of 0, and it can only
allow a slight reduction in the syndrome repetition pa-
rameters r, r′, r′′.
The first term in the expression for s (equation (11))
accounts for the memory noise in the data block during
the time tR which has to pass between successive recover-
ies. tR can be reduced by increasing nrep. If tR < (tm+r)
then the syndromes for the next recovery are extracted
before the measurement of the current ones can be com-
pleted. However, as long as the classical processing of the
syndrome information takes this into account, it need not
be a problem. The rest of (11) accounts for the memory
noise in the ancillas which is not detected by the verifi-
cation and can propagate to the data. The term nνtrZ
follows from an argument similar to the one just given for
g, and the other term accounts for the period of waiting
while the verification bits are measured, which has to be
completed before the ancilla is coupled to the data (if it
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is found to be good).
The fraction β defined in step 6 of the protocol is equal
to the probability P0 that the data block has noX errors,
multiplied by the probability (1 − PZa) that this fact is
indicated correctly by the first syndrome extracted. I
estimate
P0 ≃ βB′
(
g(1, 1), s(1), 0,
2
3
γ2,
2
3
ǫ
)
+(1 − β)B′
(
g(1, r), s(r), 0,
2
3
γ2,
2
3
ǫ
)
, (13)
β = P0(1 − PZa). (14)
The reasoning is that since the last X-error correction,
the Z-syndrome extraction network required either 1 or r
syndromes, with probabilities β and (1− β) respectively,
and only a single X-syndrome extraction has been un-
dertaken so far because we are at step 6 of the protocol.
Note that for equation (13) I have assumed that when-
ever the first syndrome is non-zero, r are extracted, which
results in a slight underestimate of β since in fact some-
times r′′ < r are extracted. Also, I ignore the variation
of β from one recovery to another. The imprecision as-
sociated with these simplifications is small compared to
the imprecision of the whole calculation. Equations (11)–
(14) are circular, but enable β to be found by iteration,
starting from a value in the range 0 < β < 1.
Let P1(rX) be the probability that an uncorrectable
error accumulates in the data when rX X-syndromes,
and either 1 or r Z-syndromes, are extracted in a single
recovery attempt. I take an error of any weight above t
to be uncorrectable, so
P1(rX) ≃
n∑
m=t+1
βB′
(
g(rX , 1), s(1),m,
2
3
γ2,
2
3
ǫ
)
+(1− β)B′
(
g(rX , r), s(r),m,
2
3
γ2,
2
3
ǫ
)
. (15)
It is found that for a viable computer (i.e. p¯≪ 1) this is
the largest contribution to the overall crash probability
p¯.
Let Pagree(j) be the probability that in step 8 of the
protocol sufficient syndromes are found to agree for cor-
rection to be completed, where j is the number of suc-
cessive recoveries since the last time an X-syndrome was
accepted for the block in question, so that an X-error
correction took place. I argue that agreement is found
whenever r′ or more good syndromes have been prepared
without Z error, hence
Pagree(1) ≃
r∑
m=r′
B (r,m, 1− PZa) (16)
and, using the protocol as in steps 7(b), 8(b),
Pagree(j > 1) ≃
r+r′′∑
m=r′
B (r + r′′,m, 1− PZa) . (17)
(This estimate breaks down at r′′ = 0 but I always re-
quire r′′ ≥ 1.)
Let Pws be the probability of a crash caused by a group
of r′ syndromes conspiring to agree on a syndrome, even
though they are all wrong, which would result in the
wrong ‘correction’ being made to the data. I estimate
Pws ≃ NGV (γ2/3)r
′
+Nh(ǫ/3)
r′ . (18)
Pws is much smaller than (PZa)
r′ because to accept a
wrong syndrome it is necessary that the same error in
the ancilla happens in r′ independent ancilla prepara-
tions. Any single Z-failure will cause the ancilla to be
in a state of non-zero syndrome. Since there are many
more possible syndromes than individual failure locations
in the ancilla preparation network, it is rare that two dif-
ferent failure locations give rise to the same final error
in the ancilla. Therefore the probability of obtaining an
ancilla state of the same non-zero syndrome in r′ inde-
pendent preparations is, to lowest order in γ, ǫ, the prob-
ability that the same failure happens in all the prepara-
tions. This is approximately (γ/3)r
′
multiplied by the
number of different gate failure locations, plus a similar
term accounting for memory failure. The factors 1/3 ap-
pear because almost all failures which produce Y errors
are detected by the verification, so do not affect good an-
cillas, and those which produce X errors do not produce
a wrong syndrome. Note, (18) does not include terms for
the noise in the gates connecting ancilla to data, nor the
memory noise while the verification bits are measured,
nor noise in the ancilla measurement. This is because
noise at these locations causes predominantly single-bit
errors in the ancilla, and these are almost harmless—see
appendix B—the further contribution to Pws is negligible
when (tmǫ)
2 ≪ γ2 and γ2m ≪ γ2.
It is found that for small codes and/or high noise rate,
smaller values of r, r′, r′′ are better, in order to reduce
P ; for large codes and/or low noise rate, higher values
of r, r′, r′′ are better, in order to reduce Pws and to keep
Pagree sufficiently large. Once r
′ is large enough, the value
of p¯ is insensitive to Pws because it is dominated by the
other terms.
I can now calculate p¯, using the probability tree shown
in figure 4 as a guide:
p¯(C, {γi}, ǫ) ≃ 2 {βP1(1) + (1 − β) [Pagree(1)
(Pws + (1− Pws)P1(r)) + S]} (19)
where C refers to the set of parameters
{n, k, t, w,NA, r, r′, r′′, tm, nrep} and {γi} =
{γ1, γ2, γp, γm}. S is the sum of the probabilities
associated with the lower branches of the tree, when
the first recovery attempt gave no consistent syndrome.
To calculate these, rather than keeping account of
all the possibilities, I use an average for the number
of Z-syndrome extractions which take place in each
recovery. This average is
r¯ ≃ β + (1 − β)(Pagree(1)r + (1 − Pagree(1))r′′). (20)
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I then have for the probability of uncorrectable X-error
after a total of j > 1 recovery attempts since the last
correction:
Pj ≃
n∑
m=t+1
B′
(
g(r + (j − 1)r′′, jr¯), s(jr¯),m, 2
3
γ2,
2
3
ǫ
)
. (21)
and
S ≃
∞∑
j=2
{
j−1∏
i=1
(1− Pagree(i))
}
Pagree(j) (Pws + (1− Pws)Pj) /j. (22)
The final division by j accounts for the fact that I am
calculating an average crash probability per attempt at
recovery. The logical quantum computation continues
whether or not any one recovery attempt gave a consis-
tent syndrome.
A. Illustrative example
To illustrate the main features of the calculation, con-
sider for example the [[127, 43, 13]] BCH code, for param-
eter values γ = 10−4, ǫ = 10−6, nrep = 2.5, tm = 25, and
we choose r = 5, r′ = 4, r′′ = 3. The code has w = 47,
NA = 1802 (see table 1) giving NGV = 3689, Nh = 8893.
In each time step approximately NA/w ≃ 38 gates act in
parallel on each ancilla during preparation and verifica-
tion; the recovery time is tR = 143 time steps.
These parameter values give α ≃ 0.74, β ≃ 0.8. Sup-
pose the computer consists of 10 blocks. Of the 25 an-
cillas prepared for X-recovery, on average 25α ≃ 18 are
found to pass the verification. When the first syndrome is
extracted for each block, 10β ≃ 8 are found to be zero, 2
non-zero. For r = 5, a further 4 syndromes are extracted
from each of the two blocks needing further attention,
this uses up the remaining 8 ancillas which passed verifi-
cation. The ancilla error probability is PZa ≃ 0.1 and the
probability a data block has no errors is P0 ≃ 0.9, there-
fore the typical situation is that one of the two blocks
being recovered is found in fact to be free of errors (its
first reported non-zero syndrome was wrong, caused by
a Z-error in the ancilla preparation) while the other has
a correctable error. The probability that 4 of the 5 syn-
dromes agree is Pagree ≃ 0.8 so the error is usually identi-
fied first time, but occasionally this must await the next
recovery. In the latter case the subsequent recovery of
the block in question has r+r′′ = 8 syndromes available,
the probability that 4 of them are mutually consistent is
approximately 0.998.
The probabilities of uncorrectable error in the data
(branches b¯ and d¯ in fig. 4) are
P1(1) ≃ 3× 10−13β + 5× 10−10(1− β) ≃ 3−11
P1(r) ≃ 8× 10−12β + 2× 10−9(1− β) ≃ 4× 10−10
while the probability of accepting a wrong syndrome is
Pws ≃ 5×10−15. The overall result is p¯ ≃ 3×10−10. It is
seen that the main contribution to the crash probability
comes from the occasions where repeated syndrome ex-
tractions are required for both the X and Z recoveries,
leading to too many errors in the data. On these occa-
sions the number of gate and memory failure locations is
g(r, r) = 2540, s(r) ≃ 39000 respectively, therefore gate
failure dominates when ǫ < γ/15.
B. Comparison of analytical estimate and
Monte-Carlo simulation
The prediction given by equations (8-22) is shown by
the curves in figures 1-3. The main feature of both the
numerical results and the analytical estimate is that p¯
varies as (γ + const.ǫ)t+1 in the limit of small γ, ǫ. This
is seen for example in equation (15), where a useful pair
of approximations is
B′(g, s,m, γ, ǫ) ≃ B (g,m, γ + sǫ/g) (23)
≃
(
gγ + sǫ
m/e
)m
(24)
The first approximation is quite accurate in the regime
under consideration (small γ, ǫ), while the second gives
the right order of magnitude; e is the base of natural
logarithms and I used Stirling’s formula to simplify m!
(even though m is not large).
The values of the fitted parameters µ and ν were ad-
justed to get the best fit between the curves and the
Monte-Carlo ‘data’. This implies that the curves must
match the data in at least two places. The fact that
the curves also correctly show all the major trends as a
function of ǫ, γ, nrep, tm and the code parameters is evi-
dence that the analysis is sufficiently complete to be use-
ful. The analytical estimate predicts that p¯ falls slightly
faster than γt+1 in the region 10−4 < p¯ < 10−2 because
the mean number of syndromes extracted is falling as β
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increases towards 1. The simulations are consistent with
this but in the absence of simulated points at p¯ < 10−4
it was not possible to confirm it thoroughly. The Monte-
Carlo simulation was too slow to explore the latter region
(each point at p¯ ≃ 10−4 took many days to compute on
a modern workstation).
The agreement overall is good. The main (but still
modest) discrepancy is that in figures 1 and 2 the analysis
underestimates the numerical results, while in figure 3 it
overestimates. In other words, the effect of changing the
r parameters is greater in the numerical simulation than
in the analysis, in the region of large γ and small ǫ/γ.
By adjusting µ and ν it was possible to get a better fit
either to figures 1 and 2, or to figure 3; the choice shown
(µ = 0.35, ν = 1) represents the best compromise.
There is a small systematic disagreement in gradient
for several of the sets of results, especially in figure 1.
This would be enough to cause a disagreement in p¯ by
an order of magnitude if it persisted to lower γ values
of order γ = 10−4 (where a direct comparison between
numerical and analytical results is not available). How-
ever, the analytical model always produces the power-law
behaviour p¯ ∝ γt+1 at low γ (as long as r′ ≥ t) so the
disagreement in gradient will not persist to low γ, and in
any case when p¯ < 10−8 even an order of magnitude error
in p¯ will only be a relatively small effect in the results to
be obtained from the model in the rest of the paper.
The part of the analysis which can only be confirmed
to a limited extent by the simulations is the linear scaling
with t of the terms µt and νt in (10), (11). Simulations
of more codes, especially codes correcting more errors,
would be necessary to give further information.
C. Performance of a selection of codes
The estimated crash probability (19) was calculated for
a variety of codes with scale-up N/K in the range 7 to
400. The gate and measurement noise parameters were
set to γ1 = γ2 = γm = γp ≡ γ, and p¯ was calculated for
several values of γ with ǫ = γ/100 and with ǫ = γ/10, at
tm = 25, nrep = 1. The values of r, r
′, r′′ were adjusted
to minimize p¯ for each case. To make a useful compari-
son, I then consider not p¯ directly, but rather the num-
ber of qubit-gates KQ which the stabilized computer can
achieve, allowing for the fact that codes with k = 1 allow
slightly more efficient fault-tolerant gates than codes with
k > 1, c.f. section II A. Using the method of ‘propagating
the gate through a teleportation’ [9] only approximately
twice as many recoveries per gate are needed when k > 1
than when k = 1 [12], so KQ = 1/p¯ (0.5/p¯) when k = 1
(k > 1) respectively. The resulting values of KQ are
plotted in figure 5 as a function of the scale-up for the
code employed. The codes themselves are identified in
table 1 of appendix A.
Clearly at given values of γ, ǫ one would choose the
code of smallest scale-up which allows a desired KQ to
be attained. The main conclusion to be drawn from fig-
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FIG. 5: Available KQ for a variety of codes, plotted against
the scale-up N/K of each code at nrep = 1, tm = 25. (a):
ǫ = γ/100, (b): ǫ = γ/10. The sets of results are at γ = 10−5
(×), 10−4 (+), 10−3 (◦); each code has a given scale-up, the
codes are indicated by an index number placed by each point
at γ = 10−5, which refers to the list in table 1. The dotted
lines joining the points at given γ are to guide the eye.
ure 5 is that for γ ≤ 10−4, the efficient codes such as
[[127, 43, 13]], [[127, 29, 15]] perform well, but at higher
noise level other codes such as those numbered 1 to 9 in
table 1 should be adopted, at a cost in scale-up.
V. CODE CONCATENATION
In order to get still smaller crash probabilities, and
hence larger algorithms, we need codes which can cor-
rect more errors. Such codes exist, for example a
[[511, 241, 31]] BCH code, but they of necessity involve
more parity checks and therefore larger networks to ex-
tract syndromes. The increase in g, s and PZa trades off
against the increase in t, and as a result these codes only
become useful at low values of the failure rates, γ < 10−5.
Code concatenation enables this trade-off to be
avoided, at the cost of increased scale-up.
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A. Crash probability of concatenated code
For stabilizing quantum memory, any code Ci =
[[ni, ki, di]] can be concatenated with any other code
Co = [[no, ko, do]], but for quantum algorithms the task
of constructing logical gates is rendered much more sim-
ple if ki = 1 and both codes are CSS, therefore I restrict
attention to this case. With ki = 1, nino physical bits are
used to store ko logical bits. Ci is called the inner code,
and Co the outer code, and their combination is called
the supercode. The physical bits will be called ‘level-0’
bits. Consider no groups containing ni physical qubits
each. To build the logical zero state of the concatenated
code, first prepare each group of ni level-0 bits in the
logical zero of Ci (e.g. by using a fault-tolerant measure-
ment). Each such block is then one ‘level-1’ bit. Next
use transversal Hadamard and controlled-not operations
to evolve the no level-1 bits into the logical zero state
of Co. This network may or may not involve a level-1
recovery (i.e. recovery of the level-1 qubits in parallel,
using the inner code) before each transversal gate.
A concatenated code can be regarded in two ways.
First, it can be regarded as a single CSS code of param-
eters [[nino, ko, d]] where d = (dido + di + do− 1)/2. The
methods described in previous sections apply directly, the
only change being in the way the classical processor in-
terprets the syndromes. Owing to the code construction,
to be uncorrectable an error must be composed of more
than ti = (di − 1)/2 single-bit errors in each of more
than to = (do− 1)/2 sub-blocks. The probability for this
is approximately
B
(
no, to + 1, B(ni, ti + 1, p)
)
(25)
where p is the single-physical-bit error probability. The
equations (15) and (21) for P have to be adjusted ac-
cordingly. This first approach produces useful behaviour
when the 7-bit and 23-bit codes are combined once with
themselves or each other, but for larger codes the G and
V networks become too large to allow recovery unless the
noise rates γ and ǫ are very low.
The second way to use a concatenated code is to make
more use of its structure, by recovering the encoded level-
1 qubits inside the network which prepares level-2 ancil-
las. For example, if after every gate in the level-2 net-
work, a level-1 recovery is applied to all level-1 qubits,
then the overall behaviour is described by the analysis
given in section IV, i.e. equations (8) to (22), applied to
the blocks of level-1 qubits. The gate and memory failure
probabilities γ1, ǫ1 of the level-1 qubits are estimated as
the crash probability per block per recovery associated
with the inner code, i.e. γ1 = ǫ1 = p¯(C
i, γ, ǫ), and then
the crash probability of the supercode is p¯ ≃ p¯(Co, γ1, ǫ1).
We can improve matters further by distributing the
inner recoveries more intelligently. The main point is
that it is better not to recover resting qubits when this
will make them more noisy. To do better, after the
initial preparation of the level-1 qubits at the begin-
ning of the level-2 G network, a level-1 recovery is ap-
plied in parallel to all level-1 qubits, but thereafter re-
cover only non-resting level-1 qubits, just before a gate
acts on them, with one exception. The exception is the
qubits in the data block, which rest for a long time if
tiR ≫ 1, so these qubits are given level-1 recoveries at
the same rate as the qubits in the ancilla. With this
method, each level-1 qubit is recovered on average once
every η ≃ 1 + Noh/2NoGV ≃ 2 steps of the level-2 net-
work. The effect can be estimated by replacing the
term nitiR in equation (11) by ηn
itiR in the calculation
of γ1 = ǫ1 = p¯(C
i, γ, ǫ), and then for the calculation of
p¯ = p¯(Co, γ1, ǫ1) use the fact that the memory noise in
between gates of the outer G,V networks has been ab-
sorbed into γ1, therefore set
Noh = 0, t
o
m = 1, (26)
and replace notoR by n
otoR/η. This more intelligent place-
ment of inner recoveries was found to reduce p¯ for all the
cases plotted in the figures.
A small saving on ancilla preparation can be obtained
by re-using the no level-1 qubits of any ancilla which
failed its level-2 verification.
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FIG. 6: Available KQ verses overall scale-up for codes
concatenated with an inner [[7, 1, 3]] Hamming code (◦) or
[[23, 1, 7]] Golay code (×) or concatenated twice with the
Hamming code (+). The results are given for the same set of
codes as in figure 5 and table 1. The case γ = 10−4, tm = 25
is shown, for a computer with nrep = 1 for both inner and
outer code. (a): ǫ = γ/100, (b): ǫ = γ/10.
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I show in figure 6 the effect of concatenating the codes
of table 1 with the 7-bit or 23-bit code once, or with the
7-bit code twice, estimated by the method just described,
at nrep = 1, tm = 25. The main conclusion is that the 23-
bit code is a better choice than the 7-bit code, since for
given scale-up it permits the higherKQ. It is clear that a
great increase in KQ is available from the concatenation
of the 23-bit code with another code. In particular, the
combination Ci = [[23, 1, 7]], Co = [[127, 29, 15]] gives a
very stable computer for scale-up around 1000.
B. Threshold
So far I have calculated the size of computation KQ
which can be achieved for a given scale-up and given val-
ues of the failure probabilities γ, ǫ. Further use of con-
catenation leads to the ‘threshold result’, which is the re-
sult that the situation p¯ → 0 can be obtained for values
of γ, ǫ below a threshold γ0, ǫ0 which does not depend on
K and Q, assuming that the noise per qubit and per gate
is independent of the size of the computer and is stochas-
tic and uncorrelated, and sufficient parallel operation is
available in the computing device. The threshold result
may be proved by analyzing the case of a particular code
such as [[7, 1, 3]], concatenated to arbitrarily many levels.
p¯ → 0 is obtained when the crash probability at each of
the higher levels is less than that of the level below.
The protocol I have adopted is not guaranteed to be
the absolute optimal one, and in particular a protocol
which had a higher scale-up and allowed a slightly higher
threshold may exist. However, the protocol has been op-
timized in several ways, such as minimizing the number
of gates which connect ancillas to data, and minimiz-
ing the time to verify ancillas, therefore it is unlikely
that another protocol will offer significant increases in
the threshold, under the assumptions which have been
made about the noise and the timing. After the first
two levels, p¯ is O(γ(t+1)
2
), i.e. varying quickly with γ,
and therefore the threshold is insensitive to details of the
protocol at higher levels.
An estimate of the threshold is immediately avail-
able by using the analysis described in section VA, ex-
tended to many levels. I use the analytical estimate
p¯L = p¯(C, p¯L−1, p¯L−1), employing the adjustment given
by (26), for the second level, and then higher levels are
modeled by taking tm = 1 without any adjustment to
Nh. The adjustment of t
i
R by η described just before
(26) has negligible effect when nrep is large so does not
affect the maximum possible threshold.
The calculated threshold is shown in figure 7 for the
codes [[7, 1, 3]] Hamming, [[23, 1, 7]] Golay, and [[47, 1, 11]
quadratic residue, for three values of tm at the innermost
level, and for 0.01 ≤ ǫ/γ ≤ 1. It is seen that if the
measurements are fast (tm = 1), the two smaller codes
give a similar threshold, that of the Golay code being
somewhat higher. For the more physically realistic case
of slow measurements (tm ≫ 1), the Golay code offers
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FIG. 7: Threshold values γ0 and ǫ0, for tm = 1, 25 and
100. Values in the range 0.01 ≤ ǫ/γ ≤ 1 are plotted. Full
curves: concatenated [[23, 1, 7]], dashed curves: concatenated
[[7, 1, 3]], dotted curves: concatenated [[47, 1, 11]]. The high-
est value of tm produces the lowest curve of each triplet.
a threshold higher than that of the Hamming code by
a factor 2 to 5. The Golay threshold values are in the
region of 10−3 when tm = 1 or ǫ ≪ γ, falling to ∼ 10−4
when tm ≫ 1 and ǫ = γ.
It is instructive to compare this threshold calculation
with previous estimates. Previous calculations have all
adopted the concatenated [[7, 1, 3]] code rather than the
Golay code, and typically no statement is made about
the measurement time tm, but a value tm = 1 is implied.
Gottesman and Preskill [7, 18] quoted as a ‘conservative
estimate’ ǫ0 = 10
−5 when memory noise dominates, and
γ0 = 10
−4 when memory noise is negligible; in subse-
quent work the same authors derived approximate val-
ues 6 × 10−4 for both parameters, with the caveat that
these were overestimates, but that the true value would
exceed 10−4 [26]. Aharonov and Ben-Or [15] found 10−6
in a model where measurement and classical computing
is avoided, where one expects a lower threshold. Zalka
[24] found ǫ0 = 10
−4 when memory noise dominates, and
γ0 = 10
−3 when memory noise is negligible. In his calcu-
lation Zalka assumed many logical gates can take place
between recoveries without causing an avalanche of er-
rors. My values for the case of tm = 1 and the [[7, 1, 3]]
code are ǫ0 = 1.3 × 10−3 and γ0 = 3 × 10−3, where re-
covery takes place after every logical gate so that the
avalanche is avoided. My values are significantly higher
than previously reported ones, especially ǫ0 which is two
orders of magnitude larger than the early “conservative
estimates”, and one order of magnitude larger than the
estimate by Zalka, despite the fact that I uphold a fur-
ther constraint in the requirement to recover every block
after every logical gate. This is a real improvement, not
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simply a lack of precision in the estimates, because I have
taken advantage of the insights presented in [14] which
speed the verification of ancillas and hence increase the
tolerance of memory noise. Furthermore, by recognizing
the advantage of the Golay code, which is more impor-
tant when measurements are slow (tm ≪ 1), the present
study reveals an increase in the gate noise threshold γ0
by an order of magnitude at tm = 100, compared to
what would be the case for methods previously studied,
and an increase in the memory noise threshold ǫ0 by be-
tween one and two orders of magnitude, representing the
improvement offered by the combination of faster verifi-
cation combined with better coding.
I estimate the uncertainty of my threshold estimates to
be approximately a factor 1.5; this is simply a judgement
based on the degree of change in the results which was
observed as refinements were added to the calculation.
VI. KQ SURFACE AND DISCUSSION
I now bring together all the methods discussed above
in order to find the largest algorithm-size KQ which can
succeed, as a function of the noise rate and the scale-
up, maximized over all the codes and parameter choices.
This is done by allowing nrep to take on a range of val-
ues, and calculating KQ and the scale-up for each code
(including concatenated ones), using whichever values of
r, r′, r′′ give the highest KQ. The values of log10(N/K)
are then binned at 5 bins per decade, and the maximum
value of KQ in each bin is noted. This leads to a sur-
face of KQ as a function of scale-up and noise rate. The
surface is plotted (on a logarithmic scale) in figure 8 for
ǫ = γ/100, tm = 25. The optimal values of the r param-
eters are listed in table 1 for the case γ = 100 ǫ = 10−4,
tm = 25. Figure 9 shows lines of constant γ and con-
tours of constant KQ, for the cases ǫ/γ = 0.01 and 1, at
tm = 25. Figure 10 shows lines of constant γ and con-
tours of constant KQ, for the cases tm = 1 and 100, at
ǫ/γ = 1.
The threshold result is indicated by the cliff at γ ≃
2 × 10−3 on the surface shown in figure 8, but this cliff
is not the only important feature of the surface. Equally
significant are the cliffs at N/K ≃ 10 and N/K ≃ 1000.
The first indicates that large algorithms (KQ ∼ 1010)
are possible for a modest scale-up once the gate noise
rate is ≤ 10−4 (at ǫ = γ/100), by using a BCH code, and
the second cliff indicates that at the same noise rate a
scale-up of a few thousand allows very large algorithms
(KQ ∼ 1040), using the Golay code concatenated once
with a BCH code.
The really huge values of KQ > 1020 should be inter-
preted as an indication not that such large algorithms
can necessarily succeed, but rather that their failure will
be for some other reason not considered here, such as
technical or environmental problems causing correlated
failure over many (e.g. hundreds of) qubits.
Comparing figure 9b with figure 9d, it is seen that
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FIG. 8: Surface of maximum algorithm size KQ as a function
of γ and scale-up N/K, at ǫ = γ/100 and tm = 25. All the
axes have logarithmic scales, labeled in powers of 10. The
surface has been truncated at KQ = 1050 to bring out the
lower portions.
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FIG. 9: (a),(c): Lines of constant γ, for log10 γ =
−2,−3,−4,−5; (b),(d): contours of constantKQ. (a), (b) for
the case plotted in figure 8, which has ǫ = γ/100, tm = 25.
(c), (d) for the case ǫ = γ, tm = 25. The contours are at 10
10,
1020, 1030, etc.; every 5th contour is shown with a thicker line.
increasing ǫ/γ from 0.01 to 1 at fixed tm has the effect
approximately of shifting the surface in the direction of
smaller γ by an order of magnitude. Comparing figure 9d
with figure 10d, it is seen that an increase in tm from 25
to 100 at ǫ = γ has the effect approximately of shifting
the surface in the direction of smaller γ by almost another
order of magnitude.
It should be re-emphasized that all the noise rates
18
100 105
100
1050
−2−3
−4−5
N/K
KQ
(a)
100 105
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
N/K
γ
(b)
100 105
100
1050
−2−3−4
−5
N/K
KQ
(c)
100 105
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
N/K
γ
(d)
FIG. 10: As figure 9, but for the case ǫ = γ and (a), (b):
tm = 1; (c), (d): tm = 100.
quoted apply to non-local gates. They represent not the
noise of a gate between neighbouring qubits, or during
the time for such a gate, but the noise associated with a
gate on qubits separated by some distance which depends
on the code and on the structure of the computer. This
distance has been discussed in [19], where it is found that
for certain reasonable choices of the layout of the com-
puter, the tolerated noise for a computer allowing only
nearest-neighbour coupling is expected to be about an
order of magnitude smaller than the tolerated noise for
non-local gates which has been given here. Also, in the
case of only nearest-neighbour couplings, at any given
time-step in the G, V networks, most ancilla qubits which
are said to be ‘resting’ in the present discussion will be
involved in one or more swap operations. A rough in-
dication of the impact of this is obtained by letting the
memory noise parameter ǫ in the present discussion in-
clude a contribution from the imprecision of swap gates.
A further assumption underlying all the results quoted
is that the computing device allows as much parallelism
in its operation as is logically possible for the networks
considered. A reduction in the available parallelism can
be compensated to some extent by a reduction in the
memory noise.
VII. CONCLUSION
The main results of this paper are figures 7 to 10, the
set of equations (8)–(26), the network details set out in
table 1, and related insights such as the good perfor-
mance of the 23-bit Golay code, and the role of the mea-
surement time tm.
The fundamental reason why the crash probabilities
fall to such low values is that uncorrelated and stochas-
tic noise has the special property that the likelihood of a
cluster of failures falls exponentially with the size of the
cluster. There are two main reasons why in practice the
noise will not be like this: qubit-qubit interactions and
the technical details of the machinery used to supply the
gate operations. The former are probably not too big a
problem, since the strength of many-body Hamiltonians
typically falls very rapidly with the number of bodies (see
comments in section IA). The latter can be tackled by
standard coding techniques such as random coding, in-
terleaving and concatenation. This implies that a study
such as the present one should be regarded merely as a
starting point for the complete structure of the computer.
One method to suppress correlations is to use a low-level
encoding such as |0〉L = |0101〉−|0110〉+ |1001〉−|1010〉,
|1〉L = |0101〉 + |0110〉 − |1001〉 − |1010〉; this is a
decoherence-free subspace for ZZII, IIZZ and XXXX
operators and so is unaffected by joint Z-rotation of ad-
jacent pairs of bits and joint X-rotation of quadruplets
of bits.
Further work in this area could address the following
issues. Does the error propagation directly between data
blocks contribute significantly to the crash probability,
when recoveries are placed in an optimal way as described
in section 3? How well does the simple noise model cap-
ture the main features of noise and imprecision in par-
ticular physical examples? To what degree are error pro-
cesses present whose effects add coherently rather than
incoherently as assumed here? How much correlation
and non-stochastic behaviour is found in practice? Fur-
ther numerical simulations could be carried out on larger
codes, mainly to test equations (10), (11). The cost of
moving information around, and the transport distances
required in QEC networks, could be further analyzed so
that noise the tolerance for nearest-neighbour interac-
tions can be calculated. The performance of further en-
coding to suppress correlated noise could be studied.
APPENDIX A: CODE CONSTRUCTION
Table 1 lists the parameters of the codes considered
in the text. The values of [[n, k, d]] are readily available
from standard texts such as [27], but the values of w and
NA have to be obtained by examining the check matrices
of the classical codes. These were created using standard
methods, see [27] chapters 7, 9, 16. The parity check
matrix of a [n = 2m − 1, kc, d] classical BCH code was
created by letting f be equal to anm’th-order polynomial
which is a factor of 1+xn over GF(2). The check matrix
consists of a matrix of powers of f , where each entry is
replaced by a column of m bits giving the coefficients in
the polynomial f j.
For a quadratic residue code having n a prime which
is one less than a multiple of 4, the coefficients fi, 0 ≤
i ≤ n−1, are defined to be 0(1) if i is a quadratic residue
(non-residue) respectively, modulo n, and f0 = 1. The
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code type n k d w NA r
number
0 None 1 1 1 – – –
1 Hamming 7 1 3 3 12 3
2 Golay 23 1 7 11 77 4
3 ,, 21 3 5 7 63 4
4 BCH 31 11 5 15 122 4
5 QR 47 1 11 15 281 5
6 ,, 45 3 9 15 255 4
7 ,, 43 5 7 15 229 4
8 BCH 63 27 7 27 350 4
9 ,, 63 39 5 27 328 4
10 QR 79 1 15 27 801 5
11 ,, 77 3 13 27 759 5
12 ,, 75 5 11 27 713 5
13 QR 103 1 19 31 1265 6
14 ,, 101 3 17 31 1215 5
15 ,, 99 5 15 31 1165 5
16 ,, 97 7 13 31 1119 5
17 BCH 127 29 15 47 1939 5
18 ,, 127 43 13 47 1802 5
TABLE I: Parameters of codes considered in the text. The
code constructions are outlines in appendix A. The parame-
ters w and NA are the maximum weight of a row or column
of the latin rectangle for A, and the number of 1’s in A, re-
spectively. The number of gates which act in parallel in most
time-steps of the generation or verification network of a given
ancilla is NA/w. The final column gives the value of r which
was found to be optimal when γ = 100ǫ = 10−4, tm = 25,
with r − 1 = r′ = r′′ + 1.
generator matrix is equal to the n × n circulant matrix
Gij = fj−i.
Further codes listed were obtained by deleting two
columns from the generator matrix of the classical code,
to go from [[n, k, d]] to [[n− 2, k + 2, d− 2]], see [28, 29].
Once the check matrix or generator matrix was ob-
tained, it was converted into the (IA) form, and then w
and NA could be obtained.
APPENDIX B: ANCILLA PREPARATION
STATISTICS
The ancilla preparation and verification was studied
using the Monte-Carlo method described in section III.
The method was to use the noisy G, V and ancilla–
data coupling networks to extract a single syndrome
from a data block which was prepared with no errors.
This was repeated many times (starting from an error-
free data block each time) and the various syndromes
obtained were counted, for values of γ in the range
10−5 < γ < 10−2.
Under the conditions of the numerical experiment, the
obtained syndrome should be zero. The non-zero syn-
dromes indicate the errors produced by the prepara-
tion/verification network which were not detected during
verification, and the further errors produced by the cou-
pling of ancilla to data, the final Hadamard gates on the
ancilla, and the measurements.
Let the syndromes be {s}. The program gives the
probabilities Ps(γ, ǫ, tm) of obtaining each s, for a range
of values of γ at given ǫ/γ and tm. I fit each set of results
to a power-law
Ps(γ) = asγ
cs (27)
where the fitted parameters as and cs depend on ǫ/γ, tm
and the code under consideration. Only values of Ps less
than 0.01 were included in the fit, in order to avoid the
non-power-law dependence when Ps approaches 1. I can
thus examine the statistics of the ancilla preparation in
some detail by examining the set of coefficients as, cs.
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FIG. 11: Distribution of cs values giving the power law depen-
dence of the probability of obtaining errors in the prepared
ancilla, as a function of gate noise rate. The example given
is for the Golay code at tm = 1 and (a) ǫ = γ, (b) ǫ = γ/100.
Three histograms are plotted, showing the distribution for
errors of weight 1 (full line), 2 (dashed line) and 3 (dotted
line).
Figure 11 shows histograms giving the distribution of
cs values in the case of the Golay code, for tm = 1. The
obtained syndromes are first divided into sets, defined
by the weight of the coset leaders. I give the histogram
for each set. This shows the power-law dependence for
preparing an ancilla with an error of each weight. For
weight 1, I obtain cs = 1, as expected: the most likely
cause of a single error is a single failure. For weight 2,
cs falls between 1 and 2, indicating that the most likely
weight-2 errors are caused by single failures or double
failures in roughly equal proportions. For weight 3, most
cs values are close to 1, indicating that those weight-3
errors which can be produced by a single failure are the
most likely ones to occur.
Figure 12 shows plots of as verses cs. There are two
features which stand out. First, there is a correlation be-
tween as and cs, for the syndromes of each error weight,
such that as increases by a factor of order 10
3 when cs
increases by 1. This means that the Ps having small
cs will be more likely than those having large cs when
20
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
10−2
100
102
104
c
a
(a)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
10−2
100
102
104
c
a
(b)
FIG. 12: The fitted coefficients of equation (27) for all the
ancilla errors observed in a large number of runs of the Monte-
Carlo simulation for the Golay code, at tm = 1. (a) ǫ = γ,
(b) ǫ = γ/100. The symbols indicate the error weight 1 (o),
2 (+) or 3 (×).
ǫ/γ tm a a
′ a+ a′ PZa
1 1 196 36 214 243γ
0.01 1 65 21 86 103γ
1 25 509 54 563 609γ
0.01 25 65 16 81 106γ
TABLE II: Linear fit coefficients a, a′ for the probabilities of
ancilla error of weight 1 (a, column 3) and weight > 1 (a′,
column 4), obtained from the numerical calculations at two
values of ǫ/γ and of tm. The final column gives the probability
of any ancilla error as estimated by equation (8).
γ < 10−3, which is the regime of interest. Therefore er-
rors (of whatever weight) caused by single failures are the
main ones I need to account for in attempting to model
the behaviour.
The second feature is that each weight-1 error is much
more likely to be produced than any individual weight-2
error. This is to be expected: there are several single
failure locations which can produce a given weight-1 er-
ror in the ancilla, but only a smaller number which can
produce any given error of weight > 1.
Note that at ǫ = γ/100, fig. 12 shows that most in-
dividual errors of weight 3 are more likely than individ-
ual errors of weight 2, but fig. 11 shows that there are
fewer of them. This suggests the weight-3 errors here are
caused by gate failure in the preparation and verification
networks, while most of the weight-2 errors are caused
by memory failure.
A further statistic extracted from the calculations was
the total probability Pw of obtaining any ancilla error
of given weight w, for weights between 1 and 4. This
probability was fitted to a power law (as a function of γ
at fixed ǫ/γ). The powers obtained were close to 1 (e.g.
at tm = 1 the powers were 0.97, 1.6, 1.4, 1.1 for weights
1, 2, 3, 4 respectively, when ǫ = γ, and 0.93, 1.2, 1.1, 1.1
when ǫ = γ/100.) In view of this and of the fact noted
above, that errors caused by single failures dominate
the statistics when γ < 10−3, modeling these probabili-
ties by a linear dependence on γ will capture the main
features. Table 2 gives the fitted coefficient a in the
single-parameter linear fit Pw=1 = aγ, and a
′ in the fit
Pw=2 + Pw=3 + Pw=4 = a
′γ, for two different values of
ǫ/γ and two different values of tm. I expect the net prob-
ability PZa =
∑
w Pw for the ancilla to have some error
to be as given by equation (8). The table shows that
the numerical results are fitted reasonably well by this
model.
The other feature of the analysis presented in section
IV which I need to confirm is the value of Pws. This is
the probability of a crash caused by several successive
ancillas conspiring to agree on a wrong syndrome. Sup-
pose the ancillas all suffer from the same error vector
e. When they couple to the data, they pick up the er-
ror vector d of the data bits, to give a net error vector
e + d. Assuming e+ d is correctable, the correction ap-
plied to the data will be e + d, which leaves the error e
in the data. If e has small weight, this will not cause a
crash, and furthermore if e has weight 1, it will only add
a further small contribution (scaling as the failure rates
raised to the power r′) to the coefficient for single data
errors, which is essentially harmless [14]. It follows that
Pws can be estimated as the probability that r
′ ancillas
all have the same error e whose weight is greater than
1. Such errors are caused mostly by that part of the
G and V networks which takes place before V is com-
pleted, in which X and Y errors are mostly detected.
The probability for any given e is therefore either γ/3
or ǫ/3, depending on whether it was caused by a gate
failure or a memory failure. The number of different e
of weight > 1 that can be caused by a single failure is
overestimated by NGV , (Nh), for those e caused by gate
failure (memory failure) respectively, hence I obtain the
approximate value for Pws given in equation (18). (For
the Golay code the numerical study indicated for that
case the true numbers were ≃ NGV /4 (≃ Nh/4).) If tm
is sufficiently large, then the memory noise while verifica-
tion bits are measured will be such that a double failure
in this part of the network is as likely as a single failure
elsewhere; such a contribution can be neglected as long
as (tmǫ)
2 ≪ γ2. If the measurement failure probability
γm is sufficiently large then double measurement failures
will be significant; their contribution is small as long as
γ2m ≪ γ2.
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